(Tom "Buzz" Rempfer served in the Air Force in the Pacific and the Middle East, and in the Air National Guard in the Balkans and Central America.)
© Copyright 2000 The Washington Post Company
Sticking Point: Why Am I Resisting the Vaccine? The Military Trained Me To
By Thomas L. Rempfer
Washington Post
Sunday, January 30, 2000; Page B01
For almost 17 years--as an Air Force Academy cadet, an
officer and fighter pilot, and now a reservist--I have been a
loyal member of the U.S. military. Yet today, along with many
other service members and members of Congress, I find myself challenging
the Pentagon's anthrax vaccine program. Some will see my act as
one of disloyalty. It is not. My loyalty is to a military institution
of integrity, not to policies that lack integrity. As the Pentagon
digs in to protect a policy under fire, debating this issue outside
military channels is my only recourse.
A year ago, as part of the program to inoculate all service members
against anthrax, I was asked to roll up my sleeve and take the
first of six shots. And like hundreds of other service members,
I said "no"--in my case, because of unanswered questions
about the vaccine's safety. Because of that decision, I am a fighter
pilot who no longer flies. I was ordered to resign as a member
of the Connecticut Air National Guard and was transferred to a
desk job within the reserves. Regardless, I continue to speak
out about the possible dangers of the vaccine policy, fight to
reverse this dishonorable policy and seek redress for service
members affected by it.
Our increased awareness of the dangers troops face from terrorism
is a backdrop to the anthrax vaccine policy. In 1996, 19 Air Force
personnel were killed and more than 500 others injured in a terrorist
bombing of the Khobar Towers at a U.S. military housing complex
in Saudi Arabia. With that, the rhetoric of "force protection"
began driving military operations. As part of this, protecting
against biological threats, including anthrax, became a priority.
Thus, I was not surprised when, in December 1997, the military
decided to inoculate the problem away. I watched on television
as political appointees in the Defense Department rolled up their
sleeves for the cameras--leading by example and accepting the
vaccine--and I thought, these gentlemen will never have to test
the vaccine's effectiveness in combat.
The anthrax vaccine seemed to provide Pentagon leaders with a
quick fix to a complex problem. But it assumed that our adversaries
would fight us with the sole biological agent we were being protected
against. This is absurd. And it assumed that all service members
everywhere would be in need of such protection. Troops who had
never before refused orders began resisting the vaccine. Some
were concerned that the military, by implying that it could protect
troops from one biological agent--anthrax--could ultimately leave
our forces more vulnerable to myriad other biological agents.
Others knew that the vaccine was approved by the FDA for limited
use by veterinarians, not against biological warfare. Still others
knew that some service members who had received the vaccine during
the Persian Gulf War suspected that it had caused them unresolved
medical problems. I could not understand why the military was
moving ahead so quickly despite the unresolved controversies.
In May 1998, the Pentagon mandated that all service members, both
active and reserve, would receive the anthrax vaccine over time.
That summer, I left the full-time force for reserve duty in my
home state of Connecticut. Safety concerns about the vaccine overshadowed
operations in my new unit. My commander directed members of my
unit to research these concerns, and said he would present them
to the commander of the Air National Guard. Through that research,
we uncovered a stark dichotomy between what our military leaders
claimed and the information readily available in medical literature
and FDA inspection reports.
Descriptions of the vaccine by the military's own medical experts
were disturbing. Col. Arthur Friedlander, a chief Army biological
researcher, had written in 1994 in the textbook "Vaccines"
that "the current vaccine against anthrax is unsatisfactory."
A report that same year by the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee
quoted Gen. Ronald Blanck, who is now the Army surgeon general,
as saying that the "anthrax vaccine should continue to be
considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian
Gulf military personnel."
Equally alarming, in February 1998, the only U.S. company that
manufactures the anthrax vaccine had failed an FDA inspection
of its production line. The FDA cited vaccine sterility and potency
deviations. (Late last year, the company failed another inspection.
Again, the FDA cited sterility and potency deviations.) We reported
our findings and questions to our commanders, fully expecting
that they would be answered, as he had promised.
We were further concerned by FDA inspection reports that identified
microbial contamination in some of the vaccine. We asked a commander
for supplemental testing data. But the Pentagon instead handed
over only production testing data from 1996--two years before
the first failed FDA inspection. Soon after, a commander told
us that our questions would not be answered and that we should
transfer if we could not submit to the vaccine.
I was outraged. For 16 years we had been given safety and ethics
training. We had been taught to recognize, question and refuse
illegal or immoral orders if necessary. Now, our questions were
dismissed outright. We were asked to leave quickly and quietly.
As a result, in January 1999, eight pilots--about a quarter of
the 103rd Fighter Wing--resigned from the Connecticut Air National
Guard. Most of us transferred to desk duty in the Air Force Reserves.
I was further dismayed as our resignations were misrepresented
at Pentagon media briefings. A spokesman suggested that some of
us had left for family and personal reasons and implied that we
had refused the vaccine because we were unwilling to deploy overseas.
Over the past year, our concerns have been validated by eight
congressional hearings, multiple General Accounting Office reports,
three bills pending before Congress, and the second failed FDA
inspection at the manufacturing plant--all of which point to safety
concerns.
Before the inoculations began, Defense Secretary William Cohen
had mandated four prerequisites for the policy, including supplemental
testing and an independent expert review. But the Defense Department
halted the supplemental testing of the vaccine stockpile in the
fall of 1998. And the expert asked by the Pentagon to review the
policy, a gynecologist from Yale University, acknowledged in a
letter to the House Government Reform and Oversight subcommittee
on national security that he had "no expertise in anthrax."
Six members of Congress later charged that none of Cohen's prerequisites
had been addressed satisfactorily. In defending the program, senior
Pentagon officials have pointed to a growing biological threat
to the troops, yet the General Accounting Office has concluded,
based on military intelligence data, that the nature and magnitude
of the biological warfare threat have not changed since 1990.
My wife has backed me up throughout this ordeal. But she also
has made clear that if I bailed out over this vaccine I must make
sure others would not have to do the same in the future. She has
reminded me that every step I take in this journey provides an
example for our children, who we still hope will serve in the
armed forces one day. For their sake, and for the sake of the
young people I recruit for the Air Force Academy, I will stay
the course until the anthrax vaccine policy is reversed.
Last year, at a congressional hearing, Rep. Mark Edward Souder
(R-Ind.) accused the Defense Department of choosing to protect
its policy rather than the troops. I agree, and I have concluded
that the vaccine is no longer about force protection; it is merely
a biological loyalty oath. In rejecting this test of fealty, I
have affirmed my duty to challenge orders that don't stand up
to a critical and honest analysis.
In time of war, my duty is to defend our nation's liberties and
interests--with my life if necessary. But in peacetime it is also
my duty to let my chain of command know when something doesn't
pass the common-sense test. As military leaders employ courts-martial
and even imprisonment to enforce this questionable policy, a contagious
group think at the highest levels has equated critical thinking
with a lack of good order and discipline. Indeed, a fellow officer,
Maj. Sonnie Bates, who testified before Congress regarding these
concerns, now faces court-martial. This violates what, for me,
defines America's military: honesty, loyalty both up and down
the chain of command, and a duty not to blindly follow questionable
orders.
While service members must sacrifice personal freedoms, they entrust
certain rights, such as their safety, to their commanders. But
soldiers are citizens first; Congress has the responsibility to
provide oversight if the Defense Department is not looking out
for the troops' rights. Congress is doing its duty.
As noted Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington observed, our professional
standards justify disobedience when a military leader is ordered
to take a measure that is militarily absurd. Those professional
standards are spelled out in our honor code and oath of office.
So when a senior military leader recently said to me, "Perhaps
if you don't trust the military anymore, you need to hang up your
uniform," I didn't hesitate to respond, "With due respect,
sir, my duty is to be a member of a military that is trustworthy."
(Tom "Buzz" Rempfer served in the Air Force in the
Pacific and the Middle East, and in the Air National Guard in
the Balkans and Central America.)
© Copyright 2000 The Washington Post Company
Last revised: September 2000