The Imminent Threat of Chemical & Biological Attack
Does Not Mirror Our Current Chemical & Biological Training
Posture
by William F. Mangieri
The Secretary of Defenses claim that it's not a matter "if"
our Armed Forces
will be subject to a biological attack, it's "when"
does not concur with
current readiness training posture. Whether the Secretary is talking
about a
terrorist threat or a possible contingency on the battlefield
our Armed
Forces have not increased the intensity of training in chemical
and
biological defense.
In May of 1996, the Government Accounting Office provided testimony
before
Congress entitled "Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis
Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems."
This report concluded that the primary cause for the deficiencies
in chemical
and biological defense preparedness is the lack of emphasis up
and down the
line of command in the Department of Defense.
The report went on to say that the DOD has decided to concentrate
on other
priorities and consequently to accept greater risk regarding preparedness
for
operations on a contaminated battlefield.
I can tell you as an NBC Warfare instructor that the appraisal
the GAO made
three years ago still paints an accurate picture of the DOD's
attitude today.
I must admit that I wasn't aware of this report prior to my
September 29
testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran's
Affairs and
International Relations.The subject of the hearing was the impact
of the
DOD's mandatory Anthrax Vaccine program on Guard and Reserve forces.
These
points I explicitly rose in my opening statement and subsequently
in the
question and answer period following.
In my opening statement I questioned the so called imminent
threat because I
felt the DOD was not actively pursuing an increased emphasis on
field level
NBC warfare training. In addition, I felt that our chemical and
biological
defense program was being brushed aside for more romantic high
ticket items
like state of the art aircraft and missile systems.
The DOD can claim that they have dedicated more financial resources
to
chemical and biological defense but money doesn't buy attitude.When
it comes
to this type of training the attitude is the same- "let's
do the bare
minimum."
My former unit uses Air Mobility Command training criteria
for chem/bio
defense. The training consists of a six hour initial class covering
all
aspects of the ability to survive and operate in a contaminated
environment.
If you are one of the lucky one's to be on mobility, you would
attend a three
hour refresher course once a year to brush up on perishable skills
that you
haven't really learned in the first place.
In addition to classroom training members should be training
periodically
with their respective units concentrating on concepts that they
learned in
the classroom as applied to their specific duties. This training
depending on
their commanders perception of the need for such activity is rarely
performed.Most of the time the unit supplemental training is inadequate
and
may consist of just putting on their protective mask and suit
for a few
minutes to satisfy the requirement.
What disturbs me the most about classroom and unit instruction
is the lack of
senior officers and enlisted attending such training. You rarely
see an E-9
or an O-5 at required training. A chemical or biological agent
will kill a
Colonel as fast as a Private or an Airman. Most of them exempt
themselves
from this type of training. At my former unit, the 105th Civil
Engineering
Squadron, our commander regularly attended formal training. He
suited up and
sweated like the rest of us. He believed in the program and his
people
respected him for staying in the trenches with us. Unfortunately,
I can't say
the same for the wing political types who are mere desk jocky's
for the "play
ball" Pentagon elites.
Base wide exercises and training deployments are even more
of a joke. Most of
these activities are executed in support of Operational Readiness
Inspections
and not because we want to teach our people how to defend against
a chem/bio
attack. A good grade on an ORI could promote a Colonel to a General,
it's all
done to enhance or sustain an image, to avoid unit cut backs or
closures.
In May of this year my former command embarked on an operational
readiness
"self" evaluation. Planning for this exercise was conducted
by full-time
Guard Technicians and AGR's. There was not one chemical warfare
specialist on
the planning committee. Those decisions were made by officers
and senior
enlisted who knew nothing about such tasks.
We deployed to another state to train as a unit on many tasks
including
chem/bio defense. It was the first time in three years we conducted
such an
exercise, not exactly a frequency that makes for a "ready
unit."
Our infrequent training habits showed when it came to CB defense.
We had
people not wearing their protective gear correctly. Some members
did not even
have all their required gear. There was no sense of urgency because
there is
no sense of legitimacy for chemical and biological defense training.
This lack of interest is evident in every branch of service,
Active Duty,
Reserves and National Guard alike.
So, my question to the Secretary of Defense is quite simple.
If the threat of
chemical and biological attack is so imminent, why hasn't the
DOD increased
the intensity of training in the area of chemical and biological
defense?
If the threat is as serious as proclaimed, it would make sense
to me that we
train for such contingencies more frequently. Knowledge of defense
concepts
will save lives on the contaminated battlefield before outdated
vaccines
will. If you want to take this perceived threat seriously, I suggest
you put
your mouth and your money on training personnel not on the limited
success of
force medical protection.
William Mangieri is a Nuclear,Biological,Chemical Warfare Specialist,
Gulf
War Veteran and an Advocate for Servicemembers.
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Last revised: March 2000